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Abstract
The study of vulnerabilities and exploitation is one of finding mechanisms
affecting the flow of computation and of finding new means to perform unexpected computation. In this paper we show the extent to which exception
handling mechanisms as implemented and used by gcc can be used to control
program execution. We show that the data structures used to store exception
handling information on UNIX-like systems actually contain Turing-complete
bytecode, which is executed by a virtual machine during the course of exception unwinding and handling. We discuss how a malicious attacker could
gain control over these structures and how such an attacker could utilize
them once control has been achieved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When a program is executed on a computer system, that system must be
able to transform the program on disk into a running process image. The
standard format used on Linux and most other UNIX-like systems for representing both programs on disk and process images is the ELF (Executable
and Linking Format) [43]. An ELF structure consists of various header information and an array of named sections, each section containing the data
necessary for some specific part of the process or process lifecycle (e.g. program text, writable data, symbol table, dynamic linking information, and so
on). For languages, such as C++, supporting exceptions, the process image
and surrounding mechanisms must include a facility for providing exception
handling. While on Windows a process stores this information on the stack
[28], on Linux and other systems exception handling information is stored in
ELF sections using a standardized format called DWARF (Debugging with
Attributed Records Format) [?]. We show that if an attacker can gain control
of the DWARF data he can perform sophisticated computations unhindered
by standard protections such as non-executable stacks and ASLR. This is
useful in at least two attack scenarios:
1. The adversary creates a trojan by modifying the DWARF sections of
the executable before it is run to create a backdoor. This is less likely
to be noticed than many other trojan techniques because no executable
code is modified and for further reasons discussed later.
2. The adversary exploits a vulnerability ability allowing data overwrite
but not code execution. He uses this exploit to overwrite the DWARF
portion of the executable (or the information used to locate the DWARF
4

data) and causes an exploit to be thrown, allowing the crafted data to
do the rest of the work.

1.1

Computational models.

Let us consider the mechanics of these scenarios in terms of computational
models. Historically, exploitation has focused on the main computation, i.e.
on the program text. When many people think of compiling and executing
a C or C++ program, they think of the process of transforming the source
code into machine code and then executing the machine code on the processor. Traditional exploitation techniques focus either on introducing new
code to be executed directly (e.g. standard Aleph One style buffer overflows with shellcode payloads [2]) or on manipulating the flow of execution
of existing code (e.g. return to libc [29, 40] or more recently return-oriented
programming (ROP) [38]). In ELF terms, attention is generally focused on
the .text sections of the main program and any shared libraries it loads.
While control of the main computation is nearly always the desired goal of
exploitation, that control can be achieved in ways other than focusing solely
on that computation.
The main computation is by no means the only computation. Besides
the well-understood program text and data sections, a modern ELF file may
contain over 30 auxiliary sections which contain data and “code” controlling
various stages of the process life-cycle, including loading, dynamic linking of
required library functions, relocation of symbols, process tear down, and —
the focus of this paper — exception-handling. An automaton (not necessarily
a Turing machine) performs each of these tasks, using the relevant ELF
sections as input. Therefore, the input to each of these automata is a program
of sorts, albeit not a directly hardware-executable one. As demonstrated
by works such as Locreate [39], these automata can be used to accomplish
potentially surprising results that influence the main program.
In this paper we demonstrate the use of the DWARF-based exception
handling mechanism, likely the most powerful of these auxiliary computation
mechanisms, to host a computation and gain control of the execution of the
main program. This type of exception handling is relevant to gcc or LLVM
compiled languages utilizing exception-handling (most commonly C++) on
most UNIX and UNIX-like systems including Linux, BSD, Solaris, Darwin,
and Cygwin.
5

1.2

Attacking Exceptions.

There are several reasons why attacking exception handling is attractive. A
backdoor triggered only by exception handling may be difficult to detect.
Aside from being unexpected (since this novelty will of course eventually
wear off), the backdoor creates a very low risk of disrupting normal program
flow. If one chooses an exception that is triggered very rarely in normal
program operation (and indeed, in a well-engineered program any exception
will fit that criterion), then there is very low risk of the backdoor being triggered/revealed unintentionally. The triggering mechanism for the backdoor
is built-in by virtue of the exception-handling mechanism.
Attacking exception handling is attractive for exploitation as well as backdoors. Code surrounding exception handling and error handling in general
is often not well tested. While good testing always exercises the error states
of a program as well as the operational states, in actual practice the error
states are often tested only cursorily, if at all, since functionality is frequently
viewed as most important and because unlike operational states, error states
are not exercised on every trial run of the software (e.g. Facebook’s outage
due to poor error handling [19]. Therefore, the likelihood of an attacker finding bugs (some of them constituting vulnerabilities) within these regions of
a program is often increased . This fits well with an exploitation technique
based on exceptions.

1.3

Contributions

We present a further step in the direction of utilizing auxiliary computations
which an attacker could use to accomplish potentially malicious goals. We
explain arguably the most powerful (Turing-complete by virtue of providing
the same computational model as typical assembly languages), ubiquitous
auxiliary environment to date: the DWARF exception handling mechanism,
which comes with every modern gcc-compiled, exception-aware executable
or shared object file. In particular, we program this automaton by way of
providing it with crafted contents of the .eh frame and .gcc except table
ELF sections.
We show that the DWARF mechanism, originally meant to flexibly and
extensibly accommodate present and future stack unwinding and saved register restoration logic, should be understood as utilizing powerful bytecode
6

that can perform generic computations. This bytecode can, among other
things, read the main process memory and register state, and in so doing
make full use of the target’s dynamic symbol information.
Moreover, the bytecode is quite efficient at representing such symbolic
memory operations and allows us to pack much functionality into small sections of data. For example, we can package our own self-contained dynamic
linker into less than 200 bytes, which easily fits within the typical .eh frame
section length, eliminating the need to relocate or rearrange any ELF sections, a task difficult to perform on a stripped executable.
We note that the technique we present has the following properties.
1. It involves no native executable binary code, and therefore is relatively
portable.
2. For the same reason, it is unlikely to be checked by any current signaturebased antivirus systems (see Section 4.3).
3. It is ubiquitous in the sense that it is present wherever gcc-compiled
C/C++ code or other exception-throwing code is supported.
4. It can bypass ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) through
memory access and computation.
5. When combined with an appropriate memory corruption bug, DWARF
bytecode can be used as an exploit payload.
6. Once control is given to the crafted DWARF “program” as a result of
an exception, any values can be prepared, and any computation can be
done entirely from the DWARF virtual machine itself. This contrasts
starkly with instruction-borrowing techniques such as return-oriented
programming.
We have modified Katana, our existing ELF-manipulation tool [30] to
allow us to demonstrate the techniques we discuss.

7

Chapter 2
DWARF and Exception
Handling Details
In order to understand how the exception-handling process may be controlled
to engineer an exploit, it is necessary to understand how the C++ exception
handling process works as implemented by gcc and as partially standardized
by the Linux Standards Base [1] and the x86 64 ABI [27].

2.1

Environment

All technical details discussed here are with regards to C++, gcc, and Linux
and with specific attention paid to the x86 64 architecture. It is important to
note that the applicability of the work ranges beyond this platform, however.
The concepts (and most of the details) apply equally well to other processor
architectures and to the BSDs, Solaris, and most other Unix/Unix-like systems where gcc is used. The Clang C++ compiler is known to be (nearly)
fully binary compatible with gcc, including with largely undocumented gcc
language/implementation-specific exception handler tables, as can be seen
in the LLVM source [23]. All work in this study has been in the context of
C++ but the same general method is used for other gcc-compiled languages
supporting exceptions.

8

2.2

Call Frame Information

To handle an exception, the stack must be unwound. Obviously, one may
walk the call stack following return address pointers to find all call frames.
This is not sufficient for restoring execution, however, as it does not respect
register state. Many functions contain assembly instructions before a return
instruction to restore callee-saved registers appropriately before returning to
the caller. This code will not run when the execution path of a procedure
is interrupted by an exception. It is therefore requisite that the information
necessary to restore registers at the time of an unexpected procedure termination (when an exception is thrown from within the procedure) be somehow
present at the time of exception throwing/handling.
This is a problem already solved for debugging, since a debugger must
do a very similar task when displaying backtraces, allowing the operator
to examine the local variables at various levels in the call stack, and so
on. Therefore, the Call-Frame Information section of the DWARF standard
[12] has been adopted for encoding the unwinding information necessary for
exception handling — although with some minor differences, particularly in
the area of pointer encoding, which are for the most part documented by
existing standards [27, 1]. It should be noted, however, that the current
versions of the DWARF standard at the time of this writing is version 4 and
most of the DWARF information in this paper is drawn from that version.
gcc does not in general check which version of DWARF a program was
compiled against unless necessary for resolving the layout of a structure or
behaviour which conflicts across standards. No checks are made when newer
features are used. Indeed, although the DWARF standard provides call frame
information with a version number field, in .eh frame this version number
is always set at “1” despite the fact that the features supported by gcc for
.eh frame have roughly kept pace with new version of the DWARF standard.
Conceptually, what this unwinding information describes is a large table.
The rows of the table correspond to machine instructions in the program
text, and the columns correspond to registers and Canonical Frame Address
(CFA). Each row describes how to restore the machine state (the values of
the registers and the CFA) for every instruction at the previous call frame
as if control were to return up the stack from that instruction. DWARF
allows for an arbitrary number of registers, identified merely by number.
The mapping between DWARF register numbers and hardware registers is
architecture-specific and is generally defined by the appropriate ABI. The
9

DWARF registers are not required to map to actual hardware registers; for
example the value of the return address is encoded as a DWARF register but
will not generally correspond to a hardware register. Each cell of this table
holds a rule detailing how the contents of the register will be restored for
the previous call frame. DWARF allows for several types of rules, and the
curious reader is invited to find them in the DWARF standard [12]. Most
registers are restored either from another register or from a memory location
accessed at some offset from the CFA. The CFA is an artificial construct
(i.e. internal to the DWARF encoding and interpretation) that expresses a
canonical address for the call frame on the stack. Most values relevant to the
execution of a procedure can therefore be found at some small offset from
the CFA. An example (not taken directly from a real program, but modeled
after what may be found in actual programs) of a portion of this table is
given in Figure 2.1.
PC (eip)
0xf000f000
0xf000f001
0xf000f002
..
.

CFA
rsp+16
rsp+16
rbp+16
..
.

ebp
*(cfa-16)
*(cfa-16)
*(cfa-16)
..
.

0xf000f00a

rbp+16

*(cfa-16)

ebx

eax

..
.
*(cfa-24)

eax=edi
..
.

return addr.
*(cfa-8)
*(cfa-8)
*(cfa-8)
..
.

eax=edi

*(cfa-8)

Figure 2.1: Example of a Conceptual Unwinding Table
We note that this table, if constructed in its entirety, would be absurdly
large, larger than the text of the program itself. There are, however, many
empty cells and many entries duplicated down columns. Much of the DWARF
call frame information standard essentially describes a compression technique, allowing DWARF data to provide sufficient information at runtime to
build parts of the table as needed without the full, prohibitively large, table ever being built or stored. This compression is performed by introducing
the concept of Frame Description Entities (FDEs) and DWARF instructions.
An FDE corresponds to a logical block of program text (often a procedure,
although there is no requirement to this effect) and describes how unwinding
may be done from within that block. To conserve space, information common to many FDE’s is separated into a Common Information Entity (CIE)
which holds many of the bookkeeping details. The precise details of the CIE
and FDE structures may be found in the DWARF standard. The version of
the CIE structure used for .eh frame derives from DWARF versions 2 and 3
10

and does not include new fields added to the structure in DWARF version 4.
Note that this does not mean that .eh frame does not support other things
introduced in DWARF 4. A diagrammatic view of CIE and FDE structure is
shown in Appendix A. Each FDE contains a series of DWARF instructions
of which there are two major types. Instructions of the first type each specify
one of the column rules (registers) as from our table above. This rule applies
to all cells in that column from the current location to the end of the procedure unless a different rule is specified for the same column/register later in
the sequence. The current location on which these instructions acts begins
at the first program text location described by the FDE. The second type
of DWARF instruction, location instructions, advances or moves the current
location to which the rule instructions apply. In this manner the entire table
can be specified in a much more compact form.

2.3

DWARF Expressions

As noted earlier, most of the register rules specify the restoration of a register
from another register or from a location on the stack (relative to the CFA).
DWARF was not designed for any particular hardware or software platform,
however, and there was a very conscious effort to be as flexible as possible.
Its designers could not anticipate all ways in which the values of registers
were to be restored. Therefore, DWARF version 3 introduced the concept of
DWARF expressions (they were present to a much lesser degree in DWARF
version 2) which have their own set of instructions. A register may be restored to the value computed by a DWARF expression. This consists of one
or more DWARF expression operations (instructions). These operations are
evaluated on a stack-machine. Most instructions operate on the top items
on the stack. While the DWARF standard does not specify the data format
of stack items, gcc implements them as architecture word-sized objects. All
of the basic operations necessary for numerical computation are provided:
pushing constant values onto the stack, arithmetic operations, bitwise operations, and stack manipulation. In addition, DWARF expressions provide
instructions for dereferencing memory addresses and obtaining the values
held in registers (DWARF registers calculated as part of the unwind process
so far, not directly machine registers, although the distinction is largely irrelevant). This allows registers to be restored based on values in memory
locations and on registers with additional arithmetic applied. This is a fairly
11

straightforward extension of the simpler register rules provided (with the
important difference that memory dereferences may be done on absolute as
well as stack-relative addresses). To truly allow register restoration from arbitrarily computed values, however, DWARF expressions include conditional
operations and a conditional branch instruction. As DWARF expressions allow for arbitrary arithmetic, conditional branching, and the storage of values
(on a stack), they are Turing-complete.
Plainly, there is a mostly unseen machine capable of arbitrary computation residing in the address space of every gcc-compiled C++ program or
program linking C++ code. For an example of a DWARF expression performing computation, see the code in Listing 2.1, which finds the length of a
string located just below the base of a stack frame. This code is written in
a language we created called Dwarfscript, which is discussed in Section 3.2.
A complete explanation of all of the instructions used can be found in the
DWARF standard [12].

2.4

Exception Handlers

We have observed how the unwinding of stack frames and the accompanying
register restoration is performed. It is necessary to understand how exception
handler (catch blocks in C++ terminology) information is encoded. DWARF
is designed as a debugging format, where the debugger is in control of how far
to unwind the stack. DWARF therefore does not provide any mechanism to
govern halting the unwinding process. What it does provide is the means for
augmentation to the standard. Every CIE includes an augmentation string,
the contents of which are implementation defined. This string is designed
to allow a DWARF producer (software creating the DWARF information)
to communicate to a DWARF consumer (software reading the DWARF information) which of a set of previously agreed upon augmentations to the
CIE and FDE structures are being used. The augmentations to be used on
Linux and x86 64 are well-defined by the respective standards [1, 27]. These
augmentations allow a language-specific data area (LSDA) and personality
routine to be associated with every FDE. Both of these pieces of information are specified as pointers (which may be relative or absolute). When
unwinding an FDE, the exception handling process is required to call the
personality routine associated with the FDE. The personality routine interprets the LSDA and determines if a handler for the exception has been found.
12

Listing 2.1: DWARF strlen expression
# value at -0 x8 (% rbp ) on stack
DW_OP_breg6 -8
DW_OP_lit0 # initial strlen
DW_OP_swap
DW_OP_dup
LOOP :
DW_OP_deref_size 1
# branch if top of stack nonzero
DW_OP_bra NOT_DONE
DW_OP_skip FINISH
NOT_DONE :
# increment the counted length
DW_OP_swap
DW_OP_lit1
DW_OP_plus
DW_OP_swap
# add length to char pointer
DW_OP_plus
DW_OP_skip LOOP
FINISH :
# finally put the character
# count on the top of the stack
# as return value
DW_OP_swap

The actual contents of the LSDA are not defined by any standard, and two
separate compilation units originally written in different languages and using different LSDA formats may coexist in the same program, as they will
be read by separate personality routines.
The result of these design decisions is that the encoding of where exception handlers are located and what type of exceptions they handle is mostly
non-standardized and non-documented. What scanty documentation exists
is not codified in official sources but is only to be found on the gcc mailing
lists in posts such as these [44, 41] or in an old Hewlett-Packard document
[14] which is detailed but is either outdated or incorrect in several places,
13

as practical experimentation will show. The best known source of information on the format used by gcc is the commented assembly code generated
by gcc with the flags -fverbose-asm -dA. In an ELF binary, the section
.gcc except table contains an array of LSDAs (not ordered in any particular manner, as they are reached from the LSDA pointers in augmented
FDEs). Essentially, an LSDA breaks the text region described by the corresponding FDE into call sites. Each call site corresponds to code within a
try block (to use C++ terminology) and has a pointer to a chain of C++
typeinfo descriptors. These objects are used by the personality routine to determine whether the thrown exception can be handled in the current frame.
A diagram of LSDA structure can be found in Appendix B.

2.5

Exception Process

The code path taken during the throwing of an exception is shown in Figure
2.2. libgcc computes the machine state as a result of the unwinding, directly
restores the necessary registers, and then returns into the handler code, which
is known as the landing pad. We note that, at least in the current (4.5.2)
gcc implementation, this means that at the time execution is first returned
to the handler code, the data from which the registers were restored will still
be present below the stack pointer until it is overwritten.
__cxa_allocate_exception
in libstdc++
User Code throws
__cxa_throw
in libstdc++

_Unwind_RaiseException
in libgcc
unwind one frame
call personality routine
if no handler, loop
return into handler

__gxx_personality_v0
in libstdc++
read language specific data
User Code
catch block
bookkeeping

__cxa_begin_catch
in libstdc++

handler body
bookkeeping
execution continues

Figure 2.2: C++ Exception Code Flow
With this knowledge, the only barrier to building a payload for unex14

__cxa_end_catch
in libstdc++

pected computation with DWARF is the lack of tools. We decided to address
that lack.
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Chapter 3
Katana and Dwarfscript
DWARF is chiefly the province of compiler and debugger authors. There are
several tools that allow one to examine the DWARF frame information contained within an ELF binary. Known to the authors are readelf, objdump
(which uses the same libbfd used by gdb), and dwarfdump [3]. There are,
however, no known tools that allow manipulation of DWARF structures at
a higher level than a hex editor. The author of dwarfdump and libdwarf
is known to be working on a DWARF generation tool which will support
a text input mode, but as of this writing he has not made available any
code supporting the creation of DWARF objects from a textual representation. A high-level way of manipulating call frame and exception handler
information is essential to examining the security implications of DWARF
and demonstrating the consequences of an adversary gaining control of this
information.
To bridge this gap, we present Katana, a tool for ELF and DWARF manipulation, and Dwarfscript, a language for expressing call frame unwinding
information and the corresponding exception handler information. Katana
is an ELF and DWARF manipulation tool that the first author wrote to aid
in hotpatching research [7]. The underlying binary manipulation framework
was written to be fairly flexible and was expanded to support the complex
exception-handling structures used in this research and improve its existing
handling of DWARF. Katana provides an easy-to-use tool with a shell-like
interface capable of emitting the Dwarfscript representation of an ELF binary. A user may modify the Dwarfscript and then use Katana to assemble
it into its binary form, which Katana can reinsert into the executable. This
power allows a researcher to experiment with the consequences of carefully
16

crafted DWARF instructions with ease.
Katana is built on libelf[10] and libdwarf[3]. We chose libelf instead
of the GNU BFD because while the latter offers more features, libelf allows very simple, bare, access to the underlying ELF structures and thus its
use did not constrain the design of Katana. libdwarf is used when parsing
binary DWARF sections. The generation of binary DWARF data is implemented natively in Katana to allow the necessary level of control and because
libdwarf is more intended for dealing with debugging information and not
designed to cope well with generating .eh frame.

3.1

Katana Shell

Programming any automaton such as the DWARF virtual machine requires a
reasonable toolchain. To aid our experimentation, it was necessary to develop
two languages. As well as Dwarfscript, it was necessary to write the Katana
shellscript. This turns Katana into a command interpreter/shell in the spirit
of Elfsh [25]. The Katana shell has not been designed to be full-featured. It is
expanded as necessary for the authors’ research efforts, and feature requests
or suggestions are welcome. It is a simple command interpreter and does not
currently support any form of control flow. It supports dynamically typed
variables and a small set of commands. The types of variables are as follows:
• strings
• integers
• raw data
• ELF objects
• ELF sections
• arrays
Full documentation of the commands available in the Katana shell can
be found in the Katana documentation. Katana’s command set is extended
frequently; current commands allow the following types of tasks:
• loading and saving ELF files and arbitrary raw data
17

• printing useful information about ELF files
• exporting the Dwarfscript for an ELF file with exception-handling sections (.eh frame, .gcc except table)
• compiling a Dwarfscript file into ELF sections
• extracting sections and data from an ELF file
• replacing sections and data in an ELF file
• running shell commands
• performing hotpatching (not directly relevant to this research, see [7])

3.2

Dwarfscript

The goal of Dwarfscript is to provide a reasonably easy means for a human to
quickly make sense of the exception handling data in an ELF binary and to
modify it without having to painstakingly rearrange the underlying binary
structure with a hex editor. Dwarfscript attempts to encode all information found in the ELF sections .eh frame/.eh frame hdr, which contain
the DWARF unwinding information, and in .gcc except table, which contains the exception handler information. While it is perfectly capable of
representing DWARF-standard compliant debugging information as well, its
focus is on supporting all exception handling information used by gcc.
Dwarfscript is to binary exception handling data as assembly is to machine code. Dwarfscript does not attempt to provide any high-level abstractions over the exception handling data but rather attempts to present it
in a form faithful to its binary structure but allowing easy readability and
modification. It is a cross between a data-description language (representing
the CIE, FDE, and LSDA structures in a textual form) and an assembly
language (representing DWARF instructions and expressions as an ASCIIbased language). In all cases, care has been taken to follow the structure of
the DWARF data as specified in the DWARF standard [12]. The lack of any
high-level constructs is deliberate. Dwarfscript allows the manipulator direct
control over the data structures involved. The sample of a DWARF expression shown in Listing 2.1 is a valid part of a Dwarfscript file. It is beyond
the scope here to show a complete Dwarfscript file but samples may be found
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in the distribution of Katana and a formal grammar is given in Appendix
C. Familiarity with the DWARF standard should allow one to understand
Dwarfscript without additional documentation, as the goal is to provide a
textual representation of what would otherwise be encoded in a compact binary format. To facilitate editing, the Katana distribution contains an Emacs
major-mode for Dwarfscript.
The ability to extract information from a binary executable, modify the
information, and insert it back into the binary is not a common one and it
makes Katana quite powerful for experimenting with binary-level changes to
a program.
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Chapter 4
Malicious DWARFs
What might an adversary be able to do with control of the exception handling information? In the most naı̈ve case even without complicated DWARF
expressions we could redirect the flow to skip a frame when unwinding, assuming we know the size of the frame on the stack. One of the simplest
possible DWARF expressions allows us to simply set a register to a constant
address. Using this expression, we can redirect any function in our target
binary to “return” to any other function in our binary. By manipulating
.gcc except table we can ensure that there is always a landing pad where
we would like it. By using DWARF expressions with logic and arithmetic,
more complicated operations, such as dynamic linking, may be performed as
discussed in the rest of this section.

4.1

A Trojan

To demonstrate the power of controlling the exception handling information,
we discuss how the ELF binary for a simple program can be modified to
yield a shell when an exception is thrown. The full program that we used
to carry out our test is not shown here but is available upon request. Our
example program simply takes input from stdin and prints a canned response
based on the user input. If the program receives an input string it is not
expecting, it throws an exception (the type of exception is irrelevant here).
This program, while a toy and perhaps not very interesting, certainly does
nothing that would be considered dangerous. An examination of its symbol
table reveals that it does not link any of the exec family of functions.
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We modify the ELF binary for this program in such a way that it will
yield a bash shell. An examination of the modified binary will not show any
differences in the text or any other section that is interpreted as machine instructions or directly affects the linking of machine instructions. Specifically,
we do not modify the sections .text, .plt, .got, .dtors, .dynamic. These
sections have long been known as reasonably easy ways to insert backdoors.
Modifications are made only to the following ELF sections: .eh frame,
.eh frame hdr, and .gcc except table.
A dynamic linker is built as a DWARF expression that locates the symbol
execvpe in libc. An offset is added to this address so that control will
be transferred to specific suitable instructions within the function. This is
necessary because of the difficulty of controlling parameter passing on x86 64
as discussed later in Section 4.5.1. The specific code that control will be
transferred to in the version and build of libc targeted (Arch Linux glibc
2.13-1) is shown in Listing 4.1.
Listing 4.1: Gadget in libc
mov
mov
mov
callq

% r12 ,% rdx
% rbx ,% rsi
% r14 ,% rdi
a4eb0 < execve >

The FDE for the function in which the exception is thrown is modified so that one of the registers is set to the result of the dynamic-linking
DWARF expression. As seen in Listing 4.1, we set up arguments and then
call execve. The call we want to effectively make is execve("/bin/bash",
"/bin/bash","-p",NULL,NULL). For alignment reasons, gcc typically leaves
extra padding space after .gcc except table both in-memory and in the
ELF file. Therefore, we have a little extra room to insert some data (which we
will know the address of) after the actual LSDA data in .gcc except table.
We insert the data for these execve parameters here. We then set up the
appropriate registers in Dwarfscript as shown in Listing 4.2. Obviously, all
addresses in this listing are specific to where the parameter data was inserted.
The DWARF register number of rbx on x86 64 is 3.
There is one significant problem remaining to be solved: we must somehow transfer execution to the place in libc we have picked. We can modify
the LSDA data in .gcc except table to control where libgcc/libstdc++
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Listing 4.2: Dwarfscript execve argument setup
DW_CFA_val_expression r14
begin EXPRESSION
# set to address of / bin / bash
DW_OP_constu 0 x400f2c
end EXPRESSION
DW_CFA_val_expression r3
begin EXPRESSION
# set to address of address of string
# array {"/ bin / bash " ," - p " , NULL }
DW_OP_constu 0 x400f3a
end EXPRESSION
DW_CFA_val_expression r12
begin EXPRESSION
# set to NULL pointer
DW_OP_constu 0
end EXPRESSION

thinks handlers are located, but we cannot trivially pretend a handler exists
in libc, since we do not even know where the library will be loaded (assuming some form of library load ASLR). The solution is to use a classic
return-to-libc attack. We take advantage of the fact that the values computed by DWARF will be temporarily placed on the stack in order to be
transferred to registers immediately upon return to the handler. We therefore set the stack pointer to just below the location of the computed address
in libc on the stack. This does, however, introduce a dependency on particular libgcc/libstdc++ versions for the amount of stack space used in
handling the exception to be known. One mitigation to this dependency
would be to use a DWARF expression to search a small area of the stack for
known values, which could be used to determine an offset. We set the stack
pointer (DWARF register 7 on x86 64) to be a constant offset from the base
pointer (DWARF register 6) at the time the exception is thrown as shown in
Listing 4.3. We then simply modify the landing pad in the LSDA to point
to a return instruction anywhere in the binary being modified. libgcc will
transfer control to the chosen return instruction, which will return to libc
and the process will become a shell.
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Listing 4.3: Dwarfscript stack pointer setup
DW_CFA_val_expression r7
begin EXPRESSION
DW_OP_breg6 -96
end EXPRESSION

4.2

Building a Dynamic Linker in DWARF

Given the general-purpose computational abilities of DWARF expressions,
it should not be startling that we were able to build a dynamic linker in
DWARF. It demonstrates the power of DWARF used in exploits, however,
and shows another way that address-space layout randomization (ASLR) can
be defeated. The only assumptions made are that the .dynamic section will
not be moved by the loader and that the order in which shared libraries are
loaded will be the order in which they are listed in .dynamic. This second assumption is not crucial, since the dynamic linker code could easily
have been slightly expanded to search for the libc linkmap entry. It is important to note that our DWARF dynamic linker does not simply call the
standard linker in ld.so. Our linker traverses the linkmap, hash-table and
chain structures directly and thus is not affected by any protections built
into the standard linker, such as protection against calling dlsym from arbitrary locations. The functionality and interfaces of a dynamic linker are
well-documented elsewhere [43, 21], and our DWARF implementation is not
substantially different in functionality except that it is done on a stack machine rather than a register machine. A brief outline of the procedure is
shown in Listing 4.4 to highlight what sorts of operations DWARF expressions are capable of. Those interested in the actual DWARF code are invited
to contact the authors directly.

4.3

Detection By Antivirus Software

It is our belief that modifications to .eh frame and .gcc except table are
less likely to be detected by current antivirus software than more common
static manipulation of ELF binaries. As most antivirus systems are commercial and closed-source, we cannot make any definitive claims. Certain
antivirus software will match against the .text section of known malware
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Listing 4.4: Dwarfscript Dynamic Linker Pseudocode
dereference DT_PLTGOT +8
top of stack contains a link_map *
while top of stack is not libc linkmap
top of stack = linkmap - > l_next
top of stack = linkmap - > l_addr
find DT_HASH , DT_STRTAB , DT_SYMTAB
index into hashtable by " execvpe " hash
while execvpe symbol not found
compare symbol name and " execvpe "
if not equal
symbol found = next in chain
get st_value from symbol
add offset to desired entry point

if it is inserted into some other (previously harmless) program, but will not
match if the same data is inserted into the .eh frame section, providing circumstantial evidence for our claim. For our test we used the F-Prot and Bitdefender antivirus software available from F-Secure and Softwin respectively
and Linux virus samples available from http://vxheavens.com/. We chose
three samples detected by both F-Prot and Bitdefender: Linux.Virus.Clifax,
Linux.Virus.Balrog.a, and Trojan.Linux.Attack. We wrote a simple program
in C++ which performed no malicious activity and was not flagged as a virus
by either scanner. Using Katana we created for each of our three samples a
version of our program that had its .text section replaced with the .text
from the virus and a version which had its .eh frame replaced with the .text
from the virus. In the case of Clifax, both AV programs flagged the program
with the replaced .text. For Trojan.Linux.Attack, only F-Prot flagged the
replaced .text and Bitdefender did not. For the Balrog virus, neither AV
program flagged the replaced .text section. The replaced .eh frame section
was never flagged by either program for any piece of malware. This provides
some circumstantial evidence that existing antivirus programs do not match
their signature databases against the .eh frame section. We hypothesize
that detecting the sort of trojan we have demonstrated would require modification to existing antivirus software.
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4.4

Combining with Traditional Exploits

What we have concretely demonstrated so far is a trojan technique. If we
have a means of overwriting exception handling data or of otherwise making
data we control to be interpreted as exception handling data, DWARF can
be used in the construction of an exploit (rather than a trojan).
For our general technique to succeed, we need a means to insert the necessary data into a program. In many cases it should be possible to perform
this insertion at runtime by using traditional exploit mechanisms. The benefit comes if we are able to use a data-injection exploit that is unable to
directly execute code to inject DWARF bytecode, which will be interpreted
when an exception is thrown. This technique aids in circumventing nonexecutable stacks and heaps and therefore presents an alternative or companion to return-oriented programming. In some situations it may require
less careful piecework construction than ROP and as a less-studied area has
fewer known detection/mitigation techniques.
There are two primary ways in which the appropriate data injection may
be done. The first is directly writing data into .eh frame or .gcc except table.
There are many C++ libraries in the wild with .eh frame sections that are
loaded read-write. Until 2002 all .eh frame sections were read-write. In
2002 gcc began emitting read-only .eh frame sections on some platforms
unless relocations were necessary for .eh frame [13]. This meant that most
PIC code (i.e. libraries) still required a writable .eh frame. Modern versions of gcc are now capable of emitting .eh frame sections that do not
require relocation even in PIC code, but on up-to-date distributions it is still
possible to find libraries with writable .eh frame sections, notably several
distributions of the JVM. Some non-Linux platforms have considerably fewer
memory protections. For example, we observed all .eh frame sections being
mapped read-write on a 2009 OpenSolaris installation.
It would be even more beneficial to insert an alternate .eh frame, since as
time progresses finding binaries with writable exception handling information
will become increasingly uncommon, and even at present only a fairly small
set of programs will be vulnerable to .eh frame overwriting. libgcc locates
the .eh frame section through use of the GNU EH FRAME program header,
which points to .eh frame hdr, which in turn points to .eh frame. Therefore, this program header controls where the DWARF data is read from.
Overwriting program headers at runtime is not generally feasible. libgcc
obtains this program header through the function dl iterate phdr which is
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located in libld which is again not an easy target. libgcc caches program
headers, however, in the variable frame hdr cache, which is static to its compilation unit. Since this is a static variable, its symbol is not exported, and its
precise location will depend on the build. While libgcc exports no symbols,
after an exception returns there will be text addresses within libgcc on the
invalid portion of the stack, some up to nearly 1k below the stack pointer. It
is possible to correlate these addresses with the data address of the header
cache. We have confirmed that overwriting this header cache can allow the
interpretation of arbitrary data as .eh frame. We built a demo using a trivial format-string vulnerability (see [37, 35, 22] for background information
on format-string vulnerabilities) as a proof of concept of this exploitation
technique. Using the vulnerability, addresses on the stack can be leaked,
and the cached location of the program header calculated. This cached value
can then be overwritten using the infamous %n format string component [37].
This allows us to bring the trojan techniques discussed earlier into the realm
of exploitation.

4.5

Limitations and Workarounds

There are several limits that anyone attempting to use the DWARF virtual
machine for arbitrary computation will encounter. It is important to recognize these to plan for and work around them.

4.5.1

Registers and Parameter Passing

Not all machine registers may be restored during stack unwinding. A hardware ABI will define some set of registers which are callee-saved and some
set which is not guaranteed to be saved. It is reasonable to assume that
the unwinding implementation will restore all callee-saved registers as specified in the DWARF instructions. We have determined, both empirically and
through examination of the gcc source code, that at least on the x86 64
platform, the values assigned through DWARF to certain registers not in the
callee-saved set will be ignored when restoring the call frame to return into.
Some of these non-restored registers are used for specific exception-handling
purposes (i.e. on x86 64 rdx is used to store an identifier for the type of
exception thrown) and some appear simply not to be restored to any value.
This presents a problem on architectures such as x86 64 where registers are
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used for passing function parameters. The authors of a backdoor would like
to be able to return execution to the beginning of some interesting function
(such as execv in libc) and pass it crafted arguments. The x86 64 registers used for argument passing (rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9) cannot be restored,
however, making this impossible. It therefore becomes necessary to return
to a point inside the target function which makes use of registers that can
be controlled. If the target function resides in a library, this can make it
difficult for an exploit to be portable across multiple versions or even builds
of the library. This problem can be mitigated to some degree if it is possible to find a suitable landing pad in the binary being modified that calls a
function pointer. If the address of the library function can be called as the
function pointer, then dependence on the precise build of library functions
will be reduced. This problem is also lessened on architectures such as 32-bit
x86 which primarily use the stack rather than registers for argument passing.
Another workaround for this difficulty is to code the exploit for several versions/builds. As long as it is possible to make a value appear on the target’s
stack (this can be by innocuous means, such as expected user input) this
value can be searched for by the DWARF program and used as a parameter,
allowing the code path taken to be adjusted when the attack is triggered,
rather than merely at the time of construction and injection of the payload.

4.5.2

No Side Effects

Through control of the stack and base pointers, a DWARF program can to
some degree control the contents of the stack when execution is resumed.
DWARF instructions/expressions do not, however, have the ability to directly modify memory or push anything onto the stack. Therefore it can be
difficult to make the code at the landing pad access values on the stack that
were calculated by the DWARF expression.
One workaround is to exploit the fact that values computed for machine
registers will still be in memory (at least until overwritten by new stack
frames), as they are computed in memory and then transferred into the
correct registers. The DWARF program can set the stack or base pointer
to point to the correct region of memory. There are two limitations to this
technique. The first is that the appropriate location where the computed
values will be found is highly dependent on the precise stack layout and thus
varies between versions and builds of libgcc and libstdc++. The second
limitation is that there is of course restricted contiguous stack space that can
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be controlled, limited by the number of restored registers and how they are
laid out in memory.
A second workaround is to take advantage of the lack of defensive programming in libgcc when parsing DWARF data. As can be seen in the gcc
source file gcc/unwind-dw2.c, the interpretation of several DWARF instructions involves writing values read from the DWARF data to an array element
indexed by another value also read from the DWARF data. No bounds checking is performed in the current implementation, and thus it is possible to
provide malformed DWARF data which will achieve semi-arbitrary memory
writes.

4.5.3

DWARF Machine Implementation

Obviously, the implementation of the DWARF virtual machine has some
effect upon what sort of computations can be performed. The current (gcc
4.5.2) implementation in libgcc allows the DWARF stack to grow only to a
size of 64 words [13]. The DWARF standard does not specify the maximum
size of the stack, and there does not appear to be a reasoned processes behind
this number; rather, this size appears to have been arbitrarily chosen as a size
that should be “large enough” for any DWARF program gcc would expect
to be necessary. Although this limit should be kept in mind when writing
a DWARF program, it does not seriously hamper the creation of interesting
DWARF programs. As discussed in Section 4.2, a dynamic linker can be
programmed in DWARF using fewer than 20 words on the stack.

4.5.4

Limited .eh frame space

When modifying an ELF binary, we cannot count on the presence of full
relocation information as gcc/ld does not by default emit relocatable ELF
objects. Therefore, if overwriting an existing .eh frame we definitely cannot
count on being able to expand .eh frame and we would like to avoid moving
it as well. Therefore, we must be careful that DWARF programs and other
modifications to FDE, CIE, and LSDA structure do not require expanding
the size of .eh frame. This limitation can be fairly easily overcome, however:
gcc does not attempt to perform any static analysis to determine whether
the call frame for a given function will ever be unwound during exception
handling. .eh frame will even be generated for C compilation units despite
the fact that C does not support exception handling. The reason for this is
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that it allows exceptions to propagate seamlessly across areas of code that
do not know how to deal with them. Human analysis of the program being
modified, however, should yield insight into finding FDEs corresponding to
functions that will never need to be unwound. In Dwarfscript, these FDEs
can simply be removed from the script file, making available more room for
lengthy DWARF expressions. The dynamic linker discussed earlier in Section
4.2 requires less than 200 bytes of space for its instructions.

4.5.5

Debugging

There are presently no tools available to debug DWARF programs. Rudimentary debugging can be achieved by stepping through the execution of the
DWARF virtual machine in libgcc with a debugger. DWARF debugging
support is a planned feature for Katana.

4.6

Defenses

There are some fairly straightforward countermeasures to the techniques discussed in this paper. If the location of .eh frame is not cached then the
exploit discussed above ceases to work (assuming that .eh frame is not
writable). This would be a fix for a specific weakness, however, and other
vulnerabilities might exist.
More fundamentally, it is not clear that the exception-handling unwind
mechanism needs to have the full power that it does. gcc does emit register rules using DWARF expressions, but it does so infrequently and we
have observed no use of branch instructions in these expressions. The gcc
maintainers might consider either eliminating support for these instructions
entirely or providing immutable flags by which a program can assert that it
does not use these features. While removing Turing-complete computation
would not obviate all malicious uses of exception-handling data, it would
greatly reduce the power of these exploits, and thus the attractiveness of the
mechanism.
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Chapter 5
History and Related Work
The particular computational model that we present is to the best of our
knowledge not previously discussed in a security context. There has been
some prior acknowledgment of the potential misuse of exception-handling
data, although it has been minimal on platforms other than Windows. The
most relevant work to our research, however, is previous efforts in exploiting
auxiliary computations.

5.1

Security of Exception Handling

At a high level, there is some awareness that exceptions have an impact on
security. It is broadly known that by interrupting the normal flow of execution, exception handling makes a system more difficult to reason about from
a security perspective because it may be infeasible to determine if all of the
divergent execution paths made possible by an exception are secure [26]. Relatively recently, security concerns have been raised over the specification of
exceptions for the next iteration of C++, known as C++0x. C++0x drafts
specifies a noexcept keyword which allows the programmer to indicate that
a function or expression will not throw an exception [18]. Unfortunately, in
certain versions of the draft (it is of course impossible at present to know
with certainty what the final standard will hold) the behavior if an exception
is thrown within a function marked as noexcept is undefined. Kohlbrenner et al. demonstrate how this behavior could be exploited in one possible
implementation for Visual C++ [20]. While it appears likely that the final standard may require a call to std::terminate in such circumstances,
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eliminating undefined behavior, the issue still highlights the sorts of flaws in
exception handling, whether standards-compliant or not, that could potentially be exploited.
On Linux/Unix systems, exploiting exception handling is mostly an unstudied topic. The implementation of exception handling on Windows is
much different, where C++ code compiled by Visual Studio uses the Windowsspecific exception handling mechanism known as Structured Exception Handling (SEH) [28]. There is some support for SEH within gcc on Windows
as well. SEH involves the storage of exception handler information on the
stack, as part of stack frames. This makes it a relatively easy target, and
attacks on SEH are readily found in academic literature [5] and the online
hacker community [16]. These attacks prompted Microsoft to introduce a
new compiler flag enabling stack-based exception protection [15].
As gcc on Linux does not use any extra stack information for exception
handling, exception handling on Linux is a more difficult target and has not
been thoroughly examined. It has been hypothesized in passing by Younan
et al. that overwriting .eh frame could allow an attacker to redirect execution to injected or chosen code [46], but to the best of our knowledge this
hypothetical attack has not been demonstrated and they did not recognize
that computation could be carried out by the exception handling mechanism
itself.

5.2

Historical Exploitation

The original focus of mainstream exploitation was on inserting native binary
code directly [2]. With the advent of W⊕X protections as pioneered by the
PaX and Openwall projects [33, 32], attackers’ attention turned to manipulating data that controlled code and function addresses rather than inserting
or modifying code directly. While preventing the insertion of arbitrary machine code executable by the processor is relatively straightforward, especially
with hardware support, detecting and preventing the case in which a program is executed with unexpected data is considerably less straightforward,
and indeed is believed by the PaX team to be an intractable problem [34].
Return-to-libc exploits through buffer overflows [40] are perhaps the first
major example of exploitation through using data to control the flow of execution. Code originally in the process image is “borrowed” to be called out
of order by the attacker.
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The advent of format-string exploitation introduced the idea of “programming” with a “language” other than machine code in exploit development
[37, 35]. Format string primitives comprise a simple language with which
one can read and write data anywhere within the target. This idea is key.
There is no fundamental difference between code and data when the computation carried out by the “code” is driven by inputs (the “data”). Machine
code is no more and no less than input data for the hardware CPU. Nearly
every piece of data is the input to some automaton; it is “instructions” programming that automaton. Format strings are interpreted by an automaton
(albeit not Turing-complete) and if the format-string automaton can be made
to interact arbitrarily with writable data in a process address space, then an
attacker is able to program the main computation even if he may not touch
the machine code. Heap-block management logic is another such automaton
that can be co-opted [4].
The more recent significant development in data-driven exploitation is
return-oriented programming [38, 9, 17]. ROP presents the opportunity to
build a Turing-complete “gadget” set using borrowed code fragments chained
together by return or jump instructions through control of the stack. The
notion of a gadget set brings home the realization that data is not fundamentally different than code and that exploitation is no more nor less than
the programming of unexpected machines. Indeed, work by Dullien et al.
shows that gadget sets can be found automatically and that ROP exploits
can be written in a gadget-independent language which is compiled into the
discovered gadget set [11].

5.3

Auxiliary Computation

As exploits based on modifying the stack or heap used by the main computation developed, side-by-side exploits emerged using auxiliary computation
systems present in the ELF linker and loader. Some of these are quite simple:
i.e. overwriting lists of functions to be called during process setup/teardown
in .ctors and .dtors [36, 24]. More deviously, the PLT (Procedure Linkage Table) and GOT (Global Offset Table) tables used for dynamic symbol
resolution by the dynamic linker can be overwritten to point functions to
chosen locations much as any function pointer used in the main computation
can be so overwritten [8, 31, 45]. Perhaps most significant is the realization that it is not necessary for an attacker to do all the work of bypassing
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ASLR and other modern protections if well-defined mechanisms exist for accomplishing the task. As shown by Nergal and others, the dynamic linker
can be co-opted by an attacker for symbol resolution without resorting to
more difficult forms of information leakage to defeat ASLR [29, 42]. While a
proof-of-concept code obfuscation tool and not an exploitation mechanism,
Locreate [39] demonstrates the power of the standard relocation system to
modify the text (or any other section) of a program at load time. Through
the use of these auxiliary systems, attackers can often gain information about
and control over a process more easily than is always possible by focusing
on the main computation alone, and we argue that the exception handling
mechanism is an auxiliary system which should not be ignored.

5.4

Where Does DWARF Fit In?

ROP is the realization of Turing-complete “data” languages interpreted by
the main computation. While the finding of these languages can be automated, this work is unnecessary if a well-defined Turing-complete language
already exists. Therefore, we present DWARF overwriting as a potential alternative to ROP that an attacker may take advantage of in code that makes
use of exceptions. While it can be more challenging to set up than ROP,
as the cached program header to overwrite discussed earlier in Section 4.4
will generally require first leaking the libgcc load address, exploits can be
written in an existing Turing-complete environment, eliminating the need to
built a gadget set. Additionally, defenses against ROP are beginning to arise
[6], and as a new technique this may remain undefended against for longer.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have demonstrated how the hitherto largely unexplored DWARF-format
exception handling information used on a wide-variety of UNIX and UNIXlike platforms can be used to control the flow of execution. This has several
advantages for attackers over traditional backdoors and over return-orientedprogramming. Notable features of our technique include the following.
• Turing-complete environment. DWARF expressions can read registers
and process memory and perform arbitrary computations on them.
• Less likely to be detected by traditional executable-content scanners.
• Built-in trigger mechanism (the attack can lie dormant until an exception is thrown).
• Fewer carefully chained gadgets required in the target program than in
return-oriented-programming. Therefore, less analysis and time may
be necessary to develop an attack.
• Does not rely on bugs. Our DWARF programs leverage existing mechanisms as an extension of their intended purpose and rely not on implementation bugs and outright security holes but on intended behavior
and intended mechanisms, except of course for a data overwrite vulnerability used to inject crafted DWARF data.
We stress the security risks associated with powerful computational environments added in unexpected places. The DWARF subsystem is undoubtedly a sterling example of extensible software engineering and introduces
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conceptually graceful method of handling complex data structures. Yet the
power and complexity of its internals far exceed the expectations of most
developers and defenders. In particular, underestimating its power and complexity may lead defenders to underestimate the risks posed by such environments and to miss a number of possible attack vectors.
Finally, we release Katana as a tool to painlessly create and experiment
with the sort of crafted DWARF programs we have discussed, so that interested researchers can further explore the relevant attack surface.

6.1

Availability

Katana is available under the GNU General Public License and may be found
at http://katana.nongnu.org/.
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Appendix A
CIE and FDE Structure Inside
.eh frame
length
CIE_id
version
augmentation (string)
address_size
CIE

segment_size
code_alignment_factor
data_alignment_factor
return_address_register
initial_instructions
padding

length
CIE_pointer

initial_location
FDE

address_range
LSDA pointer
instructions
padding
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Appendix B
.gcc except table Layout
LPStart encoding
LPStart
TType format

gcc_except_table
a collection of
language-speciﬁc
data areas (LSDAs)

TTBase

LSDA

Call Site format
Call Site table size

LSDA 0

Header

LSDA 1

Call Site Table

Call Site Record 0

call site position

...

Action Table

Call Site Record 1

call site length

LSDA n

Type Table

...

landing pad position

Call Site Record n

ﬁrst action

action 0

type ﬁlter

action 1

oﬀset to next action

Arrows indicate
expansion for a closer
look

...
action n
typeid 0
typeid 1
...
typeid n
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Appendix C
Dwarfscript Grammar
<dwarfscript> → <top property stmt list> <section list>
<section list> → <section list> <fde section>
| <section list> <cie section>
| <section list> <lsda section>
|
<fde section> → begin fde <fde property stmt list> <instruction section>
<fde property stmt list> end fde
<cie section> → begin cie <cie property stmt list> <instruction section>
<cie property stmt list> end cie
<instruction section> → begin instructions <instruction stmt list>
end instructions
<expression section> → begin dwarf expr <expr stmt list>
end dwarf expr
<lsda section> → begin lsda <lsda part list> end lsda
<call site section> → begin call site <call site property stmt list>
end call site
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<action section> → begin action <action property stmt list>
end action
<top property stmt list> → <top property stmt list> <top property stmt>
<fde property stmt list> → <fde property stmt list> <fde property stmt>
<cie property stmt list> → <cie property stmt list> <cie property stmt>
<instruction stmt list> → <instruction stmt list> <instruction stmt>
|
<expr stmt list> → <expr stmt list> <expr stmt>
| <expr stmt list> <label>
|
<lsda part list> → <lsda part list> <lsda part>
|
<call site property stmt list> → <call site property stmt list>
<call site property stmt>
|
<action property stmt list> → <action property stmt list> <action property stmt>
|
<top property stmt> → <section type prop>
|<section location prop>
|<eh hdr location prop>
|<except table addr prop>
|<eh hdr table enc prop>
<cie property stmt> → <index prop>
|<length prop>
|<version prop>
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| <augmentation prop>
|<fde ptr enc prop>
| <fde lsda ptr enc prop>
|<personality ptr enc prop>
| <personality prop>
|<address size prop>
| <segment size prop>
|<data align prop>
| <code align prop>
| <return addr rule prop>
fde property stmt →<index prop>
| <length prop>
| <cie index prop>
| <initial location prop>
| <address range prop>
| <lsda idx prop>
<lsda part> → <lsda property stmt>
| <call site section>
| <action section>
<lsda property stmt> → <lpstart prop>
| <typeinfo enc prop>
| <typeinfo prop>
<call site property stmt> → <position prop>
| <length prop>
| <landing pad prop>
| <has action prop>
| <first action prop>
<action property stmt> → <type idx prop>
|<next prop>
<index prop> → index : <nonneg int lit>
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<length prop> → length : <nonneg int lit>
<cie index prop> → cie index : <nonneg int lit>
<initial location prop> → initial location : <nonneg int lit>
<address range prop> → address range : <nonneg int lit>
<version prop> → version : <nonneg int lit>
<fde ptr enc prop> → fde ptr enc : <dw pe lit>
<fde lsda ptr enc prop> → fde lsda ptr enc : <dw pe lit>
<personality ptr enc prop> → personality ptr enc : <dw pe lit>
<personality prop> → personality : <nonneg int lit>
<address size prop> → address size : <nonneg int lit>
<segment size prop> → segment size : <nonneg int lit>
<data align prop> → data align : <int lit>
<code align prop> → code align : <nonneg int lit>
<return addr rule prop> → ret addr rule : <nonneg int lit>
<section type prop> → section type : <string lit>
<section location prop> → section loc : <nonneg int lit>
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<eh hdr location prop> → eh hdr loc : <nonneg int lit>
<eh hdr table enc prop> → eh hdr table enc : <dw pe lit>
<except table addr prop> → except table addr : <nonneg int lit>
<lpstart prop> → lpstart : <nonneg int lit>
<typeinfo enc prop> → typeinfo enc : <dw pe lit>
<typeinfo prop> → typeinfo : <nonneg int lit>
<position prop> → position : <nonneg int lit>
<landing pad prop> → landing pad : <nonneg int lit>
<has action prop> → has action : <bool lit>
<first action prop> → first action : <nonneg int lit>
<type idx prop> → type idx : <nonneg int lit>
| type idx : match all
<next prop> → next : <nonneg int lit>
| next : none
<lsda idx prop> → lsda idx : <nonneg int lit>
<int lit> → <digits>
| - <digits>
<digits> → /[0-9]+/
<register lit> → r <digits>
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<nonneg int lit> → <digits>
<bool lit> → true
|false
<dw pe lit> → <dw pe lit> , <dw pe lit>
| DW EH PE absptr
| DW EH PE uleb128
| DW EH PE udata2
| DW EH PE udata4
| DW EH PE udata8
| DW EH PE sleb128
| DW EH PE sdata2
| DW EH PE sdata4
| DW EH PE sdata8
| DW EH PE pcrel
| DW EH PE textrel
| DW EH PE datarel
| DW EH PE funcrel
| DW EH PE aligned
| DW EH PE indirect
| DW EH PE omit
<instruction stmt> → <dw cfa set loc>
| <dw cfa advance loc>
| <dw cfa advance loc1>
| <dw cfa advance loc2>
| <dw cfa advance loc4>
| <dw cfa offset>
| <dw cfa offset extended>
| <dw cfa offset extended sf>
| <dw cfa restore>
| <dw cfa restore extended>
| DW CFA nop
| <dw cfa undefined>
| <dw cfa same value>
| <dw cfa register>
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw

cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa
cfa

remember state>
restore state>
def cfa>
def cfa sf>
def cfa register>
def cfa offset>
def cfa offset sf>
def cfa expression>
expression>
val offset>
val offset sf>
val expression>

<dw cfa set loc> → DW CFA set loc <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa advance loc> → DW CFA advance loc <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa advance loc1> → DW CFA advance loc1 <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa advance loc2> → DW CFA advance loc2 <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa advance loc4> → DW CFA advance loc4 <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa offset> → DW CFA offset <register lit><nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa offset extended> → DW CFA offset extended <register lit>
<nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa offset extended sf> → DW CFA offset extended sf
<register lit> <int lit>
<dw cfa val offset> → DW CFA val offset <register lit> <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa val offset sf> → DW CFA val offset sf <register lit>
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<int lit>
<dw cfa restore> → DW CFA restore <register lit>
<dw cfa restore extended> → DW CFA restore extended <register lit>
<dw cfa undefined> → DW CFA undefined <register lit>
<dw cfa same value> → DW CFA same value <register lit>
<dw cfa register> → DW CFA register <register lit> <register lit>
<dw cfa remember state> → DW CFA remember state
<dw cfa restore state> → DW CFA restore state
<dw cfa def cfa> → DW CFA def cfa <register lit> <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa def cfa sf> → DW CFA def cfa sf <register lit> <int lit>
<dw cfa def cfa register> → DW CFA def cfa register <register lit>
<dw cfa def cfa offset> → DW CFA def cfa offset <nonneg int lit>
<dw cfa def cfa offset sf> → DW CFA def cfa offset sf <int lit>
<dw cfa def cfa expression> → DW CFA def cfa expression
<expression section>
<dw cfa expression> → DW CFA expression <register lit>
<expression section>
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<dw cfa val expression> → DW CFA val expression <register lit>
<expression section>
<expr
| DW
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| <dw
| DW
| DW
| DW
| <dw
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW
| <dw
| DW
| DW
| DW
| DW

stmt> → <dw op addr>
OP deref
op const1u>
op const1s>
op const2u>
op const2s>
op const4u>
op const4s>
op const8u>
op const8s>
op constu>
op consts>
OP dup
OP drop
OP over
op pick>
OP swap
OP rot
OP xderef
OP abs
OP and
OP div
OP minus
OP mod
OP mul
OP neg
OP not
OP or
OP plus
op plus uconst>
OP shl
OP shr
OP shra
OP xor
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

<dw
<dw
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
<dw
DW

op skip>
op bra>
OP eq
OP ge
OP gt
OP le
OP lt
OP ne
op litn>
op regn>
op bregn>
op regx>
op bregx>
op deref size>
op xderef size>
OP nop

<label> → <identifier> :
<identifier> → /[a-zA-Z ][a-zA-Z0-9 ]*/
<dw op addr> → DW OP addr <nonneg int lit>
<dw op const1u> → DW OP const1u <nonneg int lit>
<dw op const1s> → DW OP const1s <int lit>
<dw op const2u> → DW OP const2u <nonneg int lit>
<dw op const2s> → DW OP const2s <int lit>
<dw op const4u> → DW OP const4u <nonneg int lit>
<dw op const4s> → DW OP const4s <int lit>
<dw op const8u> → DW OP const8u <nonneg int lit>
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<dw op const8s> → DW OP const8s <int lit>
<dw op constu> → DW OP constu <nonneg int lit>
<dw op consts> → DW OP consts <int lit>
<dw op pick> → DW OP pick <nonneg int lit>
<dw op xderef> → DW OP xderef
<dw op plus uconst> → DW OP plus uconst
<dw op skip> → DW OP skip <int lit>
| DW OP skip <identifier>
<dw op bra> → DW OP bra <int lit>
| DW OP bra <identifier>
<dw op litn> → DW OP lit0
| DW OP lit1
| DW OP lit2
| DW OP lit3
| DW OP lit4
| DW OP lit5
| DW OP lit6
| DW OP lit7
| DW OP lit8
| DW OP lit9
| DW OP lit10
| DW OP lit11
| DW OP lit12
| DW OP lit13
| DW OP lit14
| DW OP lit15
| DW OP lit16
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW

OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP

lit17
lit18
lit19
lit20
lit21
lit22
lit23
lit24
lit25
lit26
lit27
lit28
lit29
lit30
lit31

<dw op regn> → DW OP reg0
| DW OP reg1
| DW OP reg2
| DW OP reg3
| DW OP reg4
| DW OP reg5
| DW OP reg6
| DW OP reg7
| DW OP reg8
| DW OP reg9
| DW OP reg10
| DW OP reg11
| DW OP reg12
| DW OP reg13
| DW OP reg14
| DW OP reg15
| DW OP reg16
| DW OP reg17
| DW OP reg18
| DW OP reg19
| DW OP reg20
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW

OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP

reg21
reg22
reg23
reg24
reg25
reg26
reg27
reg28
reg29
reg30
reg31

<dw op bregn> → DW OP breg0 <int lit>
| DW OP breg1 <int lit>
| DW OP breg2 <int lit>
| DW OP breg3 <int lit>
| DW OP breg4 <int lit>
| DW OP breg5 <int lit>
| DW OP breg6 <int lit>
| DW OP breg7 <int lit>
| DW OP breg8 <int lit>
| DW OP breg9 <int lit>
| DW OP breg10 <int lit>
| DW OP breg11 <int lit>
| DW OP breg12 <int lit>
| DW OP breg13 <int lit>
| DW OP breg14 <int lit>
| DW OP breg15 <int lit>
| DW OP breg16 <int lit>
| DW OP breg17 <int lit>
| DW OP breg18 <int lit>
| DW OP breg19 <int lit>
| DW OP breg20 <int lit>
| DW OP breg21 <int lit>
| DW OP breg22 <int lit>
| DW OP breg23 <int lit>
| DW OP breg24 <int lit>
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|

DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW
DW

OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP
OP

breg25
breg26
breg27
breg28
breg29
breg30
breg31

<int
<int
<int
<int
<int
<int
<int

lit>
lit>
lit>
lit>
lit>
lit>
lit>

<dw op regx> → DW OP regx <nonneg int lit>
<dw op bregx> → DW OP bregx <nonneg int lit> <int lit>
<dw op deref size> → DW OP deref size <nonneg int lit>
<dw op xderef size> → DW OP xderef size <nonneg int lit>
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